Last month, as an attempted military putsch was put down in Turkey, posters lining streets across Pakistan beckoned the country’s popular army chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, to take over in a coup. The posters have since been taken down, and the man responsible for them arrested. But the question still remains: Is the Pakistani military poised to take over?
The last time Pakistan experienced a coup, in October 1999, the context was markedly different from today. At the time, Pakistan was reeling economically, in part due to U.S. sanctions over the country’s May 1998 nuclear tests. Civil-military relations had gone into freefall after the army, without informing the prime minister, launched a reckless incursion into the Kargil region of India-controlled Kashmir, almost precipitating a fourth war between the nuclear-powered neighbors.
By contrast, today, the Pakistani rupee is stable, albeit overvalued. Economic growth is above average, with the Asian Development Bank forecasting GDP to expand around 5.6 percent this year and the next. Inflation is under control, though wages are stagnant. While exports are flagging and the manufacturing industry desperately needs to be retooled, retail and construction-related industries are thriving. Meanwhile, security conditions have dramatically improved. Civilian deaths from terrorism are at a 10-year low, and the country’s largest city, Karachi, is the safest it has been since 2008.
What 1999 and 2016 have in common, however, are the same ruling party and prime minister: Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). But Sharif has proved to be more pragmatic and resilient in this, his third stint as prime minister. In his first two terms, Nawaz was combative with the army, yet his governments fell like a house of cards in confrontation with the military brass.
Nawaz came back into power in 2013 having made amends with the center-left Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), serving as a friendly opposition leader when the PPP ruled from 2008-2013. It was a marked change from the past: The PML-N and PPP regularly quarreled in the 1990s and allowed the army to pit them against one another.
But Nawaz was not completely changed. He indicted former army chief and President Pervez Musharraf, who overthrew him in 1999, for violating the constitution—a treasonable offense. And so, in 2014, elements within the army colluded with an upstart opposition party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e Insaf (PTI), to try to bring down Nawaz’s government, alleging that the PML-N came into power through massive vote rigging. The subsequent protests failed, in part because most of the political class, save for the PTI, stood by Nawaz, forcing the army to issue a statement “reaffirming support to democracy.” Nawaz then backed away from prosecuting Musharraf, and learned how to calibrate relations with the army, progressively giving it control over foreign and national security policy, but also managing to stay in power, in part by leveraging the economic and development gains for political benefit.
Until this spring, the undeclared power-sharing formula between Nawaz’s government and the military was working, providing Pakistan with a level of political stability unseen in recent decades. But in April, Nawaz’s three children were implicated in the Panama Papers leak, which included documents identifying offshore companies and assets belonging to them. Nawaz, much like his opponents in the PPP, has been accused of corruption many times before. But this time around, the charges had greater authenticity.
Although many wealthy Pakistanis, including members of the opposition, were also implicated in the leaks, the PPP, PTI and others have insisted that an example be made of Nawaz. The prime minister announced the formation of an inquiry commission, but the government and opposition have quarreled over its mandate. The opposition wants an inquiry focused on the prime minister and his family, while the government wants a broader inquiry of all those implicated in the leaks.
In April, in the midst of this debate, Nawaz visited London for a medical checkup. It was initially seen as an attempt to escape the political heat back home, but he returned a second time in May for open-heart surgery. After weeks of confusion over his health status, Nawaz returned to Pakistan in early July.
With the Panama Papers continuing to hang over Nawaz, it is unclear whether the opposition will be satisfied with anything short of his eventual resignation.
That leaves the question of what the army wants. Does it desire Nawaz’s resignation, or is it keen on other concessions? Compounding the uncertainty is Raheel’s impending retirement this November.
Some Pakistanis see Raheel as a savior. He has been an active army chief, pushing not just military operations that the civilian government did not want, but also anti-corruption measures. His security successes in North Waziristan and Karachi speak for themselves. But the army’s public relations machine is also responsible for cultivating an outsized image that has allowed Raheel to exert pressure on civilian leadership.
In April, for instance, after the Panama Papers revelations, Raheel called for “across the board accountability” in Pakistan. He subsequently dismissed six army officers for corruption. The implied message to the civilian government was clear: I am cleaning my house, now you clean yours. It’s unclear whether that requires scrubbing all the way to the top.
As Nawaz’s fate hangs in the balance, Raheel’s future is also uncertain. Though he said he will not seek an extension of his tenure, rumors swirl of his staying on.
Does Raheel in fact want an extension? Or is the buzz about him staying—and of a coup—intended to leave the government off-balance so he does not become a lame duck? There is still much the army wants the civilians to concede, most notably control over the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a massive series of energy and infrastructure projects with Beijing. The army claims, but has yet to prove, that the civilian government’s inefficiency is holding back the corridor’s progress.
It may be, however, that what the army and much of the opposition fear is not the PML-N’s failures, but its successes. The next general elections are scheduled for mid-2018. By then, the PML-N will be able to campaign on a five-year record of economic stability, vastly reduced energy shortages, and improved security. It will probably win handily in Punjab, the country’s largest province, and modestly gain support in other parts of the country, allowing it to form a government at the center for a second consecutive term. Many within the PML-N—a center-right party with Islamic leanings—are inspired by Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its ability to grow the country’s economy and control the military. A second term for Nawaz might not give him the upper hand over the army, but it could lock in long-term electoral advantages over a divided political opposition.
A coup is unlikely in Pakistan, and Raheel will probably retire as scheduled. But the Panama Papers scandal has proved to be enduring. In the end, its resolution may require the prime minister bowing out, using his poor health as an excuse. In other words, come November, we may see not just one, but two Sharifs go, with the retirement of the army chief and resignation of the prime minister.
Arif Rafiq (@arifcrafiq) is a Fellow at the Center for Global Policy and president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues. This article was originally published by World Politics Review on Aug. 3, 2016.